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ANTILAW SENTIMENTS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS
EDGAR BODENHEIMERt
In an age of political turmoil and rapid social change, the institution
of law is subjected to severe stresses and strains which are apt to create,
in the minds of many observers, a somewhat distorted impression of its
meaning and functions in the life of a political society. When illegal or
unauthorized acts are committed with considerable frequency by law
enforcement officers, when discriminations against members of minority
groups occur in a governmental or non-governmental context, when
socially disruptive situations provoke an unrestrained use of force in a
growing number of instances, such actions are often viewed as typical
manifestations of "the law," not only by the victims of such practices but
also by third persons sympathetic to their plight.
Such an identification of law with the actual doings of law enforcement officials (regardless of whether or not they are in conformity with
applicable legal norms) is frequently encountered today by the teacher
of law in the responses of students in classroom discussions. There is a
disposition in the minds of the students, especially those critical of their
society, to generalize misuses and perversions of legal procedures into
examples of operative principles of legal control. The conclusion may
easily ensue from such generalizations that the essence of law is repression
of unpopular groups or a technique for crackdowns on troublesome, nonconforming individuals by those in authority, while the more traditional
image of the law as a standard against which the legality of official acts of
coercion must be measured is repudiated as a hypocritical or fraudulent
form of idealistic thinking. The next step in this pattern of reasoning is a
wholesale rejection of the institution of law. The assumption is made that
a system of controls which lends itself to authoritarian or oppressive uses
is a manifestation and concomitant of a diseased form of society. A hope
and expectation is nurtured in the minds of the critics that the more pert Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
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feet community of the future will have no difficulty in dispensing with
such an instrumentality of coercive rule.
There is another ideological source from which the contemporary
stream of discontent with legal regulations and restraints is fed. The
opinion prevails in certain sectors of the modern youth movement that no
group in society has any legitimate authority to make binding rules for
any other group of human beings. This far-reaching extension of individualistic thinking is apt to question, for example, the propriety of any legislation requiring the covering of the human body, or abstention from certain types of sexual practices, or restrictions on the use of psychedelic
drugs. Since a great deal of law consists of impediments to an untrammeled exercise of personal freedom, the institution "will necessarily become
suspect in the eyes of those who regard the "doing of your own thing"
as the essence of human fulfillment.
It would be wholly inadequate to dismiss the antilaw philosophy
current in many youthful quarters today as an extravagance contrived
by untrained and immature minds. There exists, on the extremes of the
philosophical, political, and sociological spectrum, an impressive body of
authority which, though it may not support certain concrete manifestations of latter-day antagonism to legal controls, generally gives aid and
comfort to the view that law is an anachronistic institution, embodying
the values of a misguided past and present, ,which is deserving of speedy
relegation to the museum of historical antiquities.
One such fountainhead of authority can be traced to the writings of
a highly influential thinker of the late nineteenth century whose views are
having a still growing impact on the thinking of intellectuals in the
United States. Friedrich Nietzsche advanced the thesis that law was a
fetter upon the activation of the individual's power impulse. Since he
considered this impulse as the prime motive force in human life which
should be allowed full sway, he viewed the law with antipathy and distaste and sought to allocate to it a secondary role in the regulation of
human affairs. "Legal conditions," he asserted, "can never be other than
exceptional conditions, since they constitute a partial restriction of the
will of life, which is bent upon power." 1 He found justification for the
making of legal arrangements chiefly in two situations: (1) where, due
to an equality of strength, a stalemate or standoff between holders of
power had occurred which required temporary adjustments or "bargains,"
and (2) where, in a context of dominance and subordination, it was
deemed prudent by the ruling powers to grant concessions in the form of
1. F. NIETZscHE,
INGS OF NIETZSCHE 512
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(Kaufmann ed. 1968).
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"rights" to the weaker members of society in order to ensure their cooperation and loyalty. In both of these situations, however, the creation
of legal relations resulting in the allocation of rights was not an end in
itself but merely a temporary expedient adopted for the purpose of
stabilizing existing power constellations. Any substantial change in the
relative position and strength of one of the parties terminated, in his
opinion, the strict obligation to respect the rights of the other side: "When
we have become a great deal more powerful, the rights of others cease
for us, at least in the form in which we have so far conceded them."2
In this view, law merely serves as a temporary breathing spell, an
armistice in a relentless struggle for power. Nietzsche was afraid that
a legal order conceived of as a means for granting equal justice to all,
without respect of persons and their rank in society, would be destructive
of the natural hierarchy of domination and subjection which he considered a necessary condition of social organization:
A legal order thought of as sovereign and universal, not
as a means in the struggle between power-complexes but as a
means of preventing all struggle in general-perhaps after the
communistic clich6 of Diihring that every will must consider
every other will its equal-would be a principle hostile to life,
an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt
to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret
path to nothingness.'
A second frontal assault on the law was launched, for reasons
diametrically opposed to those responsible for Nietzsche's hostile attitude,
by certain groups associated politically with the extreme left. Nietzsche
distrusted the law because he considered it an undue shackle upon the
power impulses of the strong. He imputed anti-elitist and democratic
connotations to the concept of law and feared its use by the combined
forces of the lower classes to bring about an egalitarian form of society.
The leftist antilaw philosophy, in utmost contrast to this position, looks
upon law as an anti-egalitarian and pro-elitist device for the perpetuation
of class rule, a weapon used by the strong to oppress the weak. An
elimination of legal controls in the society of the future is deemed
desirable by the adherents of this view on the assumption that the
demise of law would guarantee the achievement of true freedom and
2. F.

NIETzscHE,

(Kaufmann ed. 1968).
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equality, the disappearance of all forms of dominion by men over
other men.
The original sources of authority for the leftist challenge to the law
are scanty since the fathers of political leftism, Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, never undertook a thoroughgoing analysis of the phenomenon
of law. Furthermore, pertinent statements are ambiguous and susceptible
of conflicting interpretations. One source, often quoted by Marxists, is the
following passage from Marx's Communist Manifesto, addressed to the
bourgeoisie of his day: "Your jurisprudence is but the will of your class
made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are
determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class." ' This
sentence, however, does not go further than to characterize bourgeois
law as an expression of class will and sets forth no generalized judgment on the nature of law. It also contains no pronouncement to the
effect that the classless society of the future envisaged by Marx could
conveniently dispense with the institution of law.
The authority for the last-mentioned assumption is usually found
in the following statement by Engels:
The first act in which the state really comes forward as the
representative of society as a whole-the taking of possession
of the means of production in the name of society-is at the
same time its last independent act as a state. The interference
of state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one
sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government
of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the
direction of the processes of production. The state is not
"abolished," it withers away.'
It will be noted that this statement does not specifically refer to the
law; it merely predicts the disappearance of state power in a socialist
economic order. While it is possible that Engels viewed state and law
as twin institutions whose fate in future society would be a common
one, such a presupposition was never made explicit by him. Certainly
a modern, refined, sociological conception of law is aware of the fact
that law is not necessarily tied to state power and may well exist in
other forms of social organization.
Notwithstanding the paucity, vagueness, and ambiguity of pronouncements by the "founding fathers" of Marxism, the notion that
law is in its essence a tool of class rule destined to disappear in socialist
4.
5.

K. MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (pt. II) 47 (Possony ed. 1954).
F. ENGELS, ANTI-DuHRING 309 (Burns ed. 1935).
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society received a great deal of favor and attention in the writings of
certain Soviet Russian legal authors during the 1920's.6 The "witheringaway" doctrine, in particular, was expounded in an original and interesting manner by E. B. Pashukanis, whose rise and fall as the dean of
Soviet legal philosophers and eventual execution as a traitor to Marxism
contributes an odd chapter in the history of legal thought.' For a
number of years his ideas were very much in vogue among Soviet
jurists, but a retreat from the notion that socialism and law were inherently incompatible was staged (without complete abandonment of
this doctrine) when the Soviet rulers discovered that they could not
dispense with the law as an instrumentality of social control.
There are indications that this retreat is not confined to the "withering away" doctrine but is gradually being extended to other facets of
earlier Soviet legal theory. What may be in the offing is, in this writer's
opinion, a basic revision of legal thinking which may herald an eventual
"repeal" of the class-whip conception of law (which at one time found
its official recognition in a Soviet statute). Of particular interest in
this connection is an article published in 1968 by L. S. Mamut, Senior
Research Assistant at the Institute of State and Law at the U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences. 8 Mamut in this article ascribes to Marx a full
awareness of the fact that law might be used by nondominant or disfavored classes in society to wrest lasting concessions from the ruling
powers. To prove this contention, Mamut makes reference to passages
in Marx's Das Kapital which point out that the English Parliament in
his time had repealed certain laws against strikes and trade unions under
the pressure of the masses, that it had revised the stringent conspiracy
laws which had hampered the growth of labor organizations, and that
it had introduced the ten-hour working day.
One characteristic paragraph in Mamut's essay reads as follows:
"According to Marx . . . the intervention of the law is dictated by the

effort to restrain excessive evil-doing on the part of the masters of the
factories, mines, mills, and means of communication, and to prevent a
destructive exhaustion of all the physical and mental energy of the
proletarians ...

."

He also suggests that Marx attributed great import-

6. The volume entitled SovIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Hazard ed. 1951) provides the
reader with ample source materials for a study of this period. See also Bodenheimer,

The Impasse of Soviet Legal Philosophy, 38 CORN. L.Q. 51 (1952).

7. Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, in SovIET LEGAL
PHmosoPHY 111-225 (Hazard ed. 1951). See also Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinski:

A Study in the Development of Marxian Legal Theory, 47 MicH. L.
8. Mamut, Questions of Law in Marx's Capital, 6 SOVIET LAW
3 (1968).
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ance to the successes of the proletariat in the field of legislation, because
"the workers attain by means of a universal act of legislation what they
could hardly have gained by a multiplicity of isolated individual efforts."
This reinterpretation of Marx obviously subverts the associations
which orthodox Marxist theory, especially in its early Soviet variety,
had linked with the concept of law. The earlier theory viewed law as an
institution designed to serve the benefit and advantage of the ruling
class, with the consequence that law was considered an undesirable
adjunct of an unjust society. According to Mamut, on the other hand,
Marx was willing to concede that law could also serve as a brake upon
class interest, a weapon of progress wielded by the lower classes in
society to ameliorate their position. Similar volte-face reappraisals of
Marx's attitude toward law have recently appeared in print in East
Germany.'
While such developments mark the beginning of an attempt on
the part of legal theorists in the Soviet orbit to restore the law to a
position of ideological respectability, the antilaw attitude has experienced
a renaissance in the United States, Germany, France, and other countries
of the Western World in the rise of a neo-marxist philosophy espoused
by the New Left. Interestingly enough, this new philosophy has repeated
the phenomenon found in original Marxism: the intellectual fathers of
the movement do not address themselves clearly and specifically to the
problem of whether or not law is a beneficial institution worthy of being
preserved in the sociey of the future. I have not been able, for instance,
to find any open denunciation of the law in the writings of Herbert
Marcuse, who is unquestionably a leader of neo-marxist thought. The
reason why he has been identified with the antilaw forces"° must
probably be sought in an overall interpretation of his philosophy, which
includes a declaration of war on all social institutions repressive of freedom (among which he might count the law or at least substantial segments of it). Another spokesman for the New Left, Ernst Bloch, has
vaguely hinted at the likelihood of a demise or at least significant decline
of law in a regenerated society, without committing himself definitely
and forcefully to this prophesy." Positive expressions of opposition or
hostility to the law are, on the other hand, frequently encountered in
discussions with young representatives of radical thought and especially
9. G. HANEY, SOZIALISTISCHES RECHT UND PERS6NLICHKEIT 29-43 (1967).
See
incorrect when bourgeois theoreticians, due to complete
particularly page 38: "It is ....
ignorance, impute to Marxism the view that it represents law as a form of 'ruling class
ideology'." (My translation)
10. See M MARcic, REcsITSPHILOSOPHE: EINE EINFUHRUNG 49 (1969).
11. E. BLOCH, NATURRECHT UND MENSCHLICHE WiIDE 257-59, 269 (1961).
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the law students among this group. By equating unlawful or overstrict
acts of law enforcement officials, instances of discriminatory treatment
of minority groups, antisocial uses of loopholes in taxation statutes,
and restrictions on political activism more or less with "the law" itself,
the youthful critics of the law foresee an erosion and eventual disappearance of legal controls in a reconstructed society of full-fledged
freedom and equality.
While it is primarily the Marxist pattern of challenge to the law
which has shaped the thinking of the New Left, the observer of the
contemporary academic scene will also find that Nietzsche's skeptical
attitude toward traditional forms of social control has had an impact on
the minds of many young intellectuals. Upon first impression, this
may seem surprising since Nietzsche's elitism and aristocratic disdain
of equality is quite incompatible with the political and social ideas which
inspire the activist groups among the students today. There are, however, good reasons for the substantial attraction, which the Nietzschean
philosophy has exercised upon the thinking of the new generation.
Nietzsche was a severe and unflagging challenger of the cultural and
moral convictions which are still accepted today by the majority of
elders in the Western World. His relentless attacks upon middle class
values and conventional modes of living have furnished a great deal of
grist upon the mills of social criticism engaged in by the alienated part
of today's youth.
Furthermore, Nietzsche advocated a vitalistic, ego-expanding, limitrejecting attitude toward life which has substantial points of contact
with the "do your own thing" philosophy fashionable in many quarters
today. The aggressive dynamism preached by him is essentially contemptuous of the restraints which the law imposes upon many spontaneous manifestations of a rationally uncontrolled life-will. Nietzsche's
downgrading of the law as a universal regulatory agency has therefore
added weight and momentum to the suspicion with which the law is
often viewed today even by those who have chosen to make it their
lifetime vocation.
Neither Nietzsche nor the leaders of Marxist thought were lawyers.
It might therefore seem logical for the teacher of jurisprudence or social
theory-provided he does not share the sentiments of the skeptics-to
refer his students to the body of professional opinion about law, the
considered judgment of experts who have studied their subject from
close range. But there are two good reasons why such referral to the
possessors of "know-how" would not meet with acceptance and success.
First, their appraisal of the merits of law would presumably be dis-
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missed as biased, as an ex parte statement of persons with a vested
interest in a subject from which they derive financial returns and social
prestige. Second, and this is the weightier obstacle, there exists no
unified or homogeneous expert opinion regarding the nature and functions of law. Law has variously been described by professional jurists
as a bulwark of freedom; as a guarantor of human dignity and equality;
as a congeries of rules of conduct safeguarding order and security in
societal life; as a neutral tool of governmental control which can be used
for good as well as evil purposes; as a system of repressive restraints
on liberty and individual autonomy; and as an instrument of domination
used by a ruling group (an "establishment") to perpetuate inequality and
class stratification. Deference to the opinion of legal experts thus would
compound rather than alleviate the confusion. Kant's remark that "the
jurists are still searching for a definition for their concept of law"12
turns out to be as true today as it was in Kant's own time.
As long as the institution of law was taken for granted and operated
on a fairly satisfactory basis on the various levels of societal organization,
the theoretical controversies concerning the nature and functions of law
could safely remain the hobby of specialists. But when "the law" as an
agency of political control-and not merely one particular system of lawbecomes engulfed in a crisis of major dimensions, when the gauntlet of
radical doubt regarding its general usefulness and beneficial role is
thrown into the arena of political and philosophical discussion by articulate members of a rising generation of professional leaders, then it is time
to reflect on the foundations of social order and undertake a wholesale
re-evaluation of an institution whose continued existence may be in
jeopardy. Otherwise the quality of life in national and international
society may become deeply affected by presuppositions which, on deeper
analysis, may be incapable of standing close scrutiny.
In a time of trouble when the political barometer points to "storm,"13
it will not serve the public interest to focus jurisprudential inquiry
principally, as has been the fashion during the last decade, on conceptual
analysis stimulated by developments in modern symbolic logic, or on
sophisticated investigations of legal semantics. The range of vital, perplexing questions relating to the survival of civilization and organized
society is too comprehensive to permit of extended journeys to the
playful grounds of an intellectual Disneyland. It should also be emphasized
12. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON II, ch. 1, § 1 (2d ed. 1787). Since all
published English translations erroneously render the German word "Recht" into "right,"
I have supplied my own translation.
13. I have borrowed this metaphor from R. MARcic, supra note 10, at 26.
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that the answers to the questions engendered by the radical contemporary challenge to the law require more than empirical studies of actual
human behavior, the compilation of social statistics, and similar activities (often producing largely quantitative results) which have dominated social science research in the recent past. They demand sustained
rational reflection and vivid dialectical argumentation concerning the
nature of the building stones which are indispensable for the erection or
preservation of healthy social structures. How broad or narrow should
be the role assigned to the law in the creation and maintenance of such
structures? Is law too much of a fetter on the individual's power,
authenticity, and autonomy? Is it a brake on self-realization and progress and for this reason undesirable as a universal regulator of human
affairs? Should legal arrangements remain exceptional conditions, limited
to situations where clashes of wills require temporary adjustments? Is
it true that the will to power is the primary and most beneficial force in
human life? Or, is there a deep-seated psychological need for law, which
is rooted in certain traits of nature more basic and less transient than
the desire to have occasional breathing spells in a relentless struggle of
individual and collective wills? These would be examples of questions
raised by the Nietzschean challenge to the law.
Has law, in its most significant historical manifestations, been a
tool of repressive class rule rather than an agency for the amelioration
of social conditions? Differently expressed, has law been used primarily
as a weapon by the strong to subjugate the weak, by dominant groups
against the mass of the citizens, or has the institution served principally
as a shield designed to protect the common man from arbitrary exercises
of power by the mighty? Has law perhaps performed both of these
functions in historical alternations, depending on the uses made of it
in particular political, economic, and social contexts? If this last interpretation is true, what has been the chief impact of law on the lives of
human beings in the history of civilization? Has it been beneficial or
oppressive? Would a symbolic representation of the law choose Magna
Carta (with its British and American progeny) as the prototype of
law in civilized society or the Sedition Act of 1798? Does the history
of ancient Roman Law (which can be surveyed from its beginnings in
the Roman city state to its end at the time of the fall of the Roman
Empire) throw any light on these questions? On an over-all evaluation,
has the institution of law, bestowed on us a heritage of distinct values
and social-psychological benefits which make it desirable to preserve it
rather than let it "wither away"? These would be types of questions to
which a response is called for by the Marxian challenge to the law.
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The endeavor to answer these questions will require a harnessing
of the efforts of many disciplines. Psychology, anthropology, sociology,
history, philosophy, and jurisprudence will have to join hands in a
collaborative venture of major scale in providing an adequate analysis
of the functions which law has performed for mankind in the past and
which it can be expected to perform in the future. It cannot be taken for
granted that meaningful and satisfactory answers will emerge from
such inquiries. The objective validity of any conclusions resulting from
them will certainly be questioned by positivistic skeptics, who will
argue that these conclusions are conditioned by arbitrarily-selected definitions of law and purely subjective ways of interpreting the historical and
sociological materials. The controversial character of the methodological
tools to be used in such investigations will make it mandatory for the
researcher to lay bare the fundamental epistemological and value assumptions on which his inquiries are based. Intellectual honesty requires
this all the more as that which is at stake in such investigations is
evaluation-justification or censure-rather than mere description of an
institution."4
In contrast to much recent jurisprudential work which has dealt
with problems of secondary rather than basic import, the legal scholar
to be honored in this issue of the Indiana Law Journal has never
ceased to write about law in the "grand manner." He has repudiated
the reductionist premises on which much of the analytic and semantic
jurisprudence currently in vogue is predicated, preferring instead to
approach the phenomenon of law from broadly-defined philosophical
foundations.
A great deal of insight can be gained from a study of Jerome Hall's
writings into some of the problems concerning the law which have
been touched upon in the present essay. First, he has fought the proposition that law, in a radically empiricist manner, can be identified
with the actual doings of men, especially law enforcement officers, a
view which is so often encountered today by the teacher of jurisprudence
in discussions with his students. He has insisted that laws constitute
normative standards, prescriptions of what ought to be done rather than
mere descriptions of the factual conduct of private persons or functionaries of government. He has at the same time emphasized the
dependence of the norms on existing social conditions, psychological
data, and the cultural matrix. 5
14. I have stated my own views on social science methods in E. BODENHEIMER,
TREATiSE ON JUsTICE 44-56 (1967).
15. See Hall, Reason and Reality in Jurisprudence, 7 BuFF. L. REV. 351, 372-80
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Secondly, he has strongly opposed the assertion that law is a system
of governmental mandates unlinked even to minimum postulates of
ethical behavior. He has advocated the adoption of a restrictive meaning
of law which would limit the term to "actual ethical power norms"
resting on a substantial volume of popular acceptance and which would
exclude "sheer power norms" of an oppressive character. Although Hall
would be the last one to deny that a particular legal system may go
through periods of sickness and decay, he has maintained that, in the
total picture of human historical experience, law has played a salutary
and beneficial role.' "
Third, Jerome Hall has been a leading protagonist of the position,
endorsed in the present essay, that the jurisprudence of the future must
be based on a broad-gauged integration of anthropological, sociological,
psychological, and ethical knowledge into the analysis of the nature and
functions of law."7 His work in legal philosophy as well as criminal theory
is imbued with the conviction that legal precepts and legal arrangements
are not abstractions dwelling in a social vacuum but reflections of cultural
developments and psychological needs which, after having passed through
the evaluative filter of the human mind, have made many worthwhile
contributions to civilized human existence.
The value-oriented, synthetic jurisprudence of the coming decades
will derive much benefit from a close study of the writings of Jerome Hall.
(1958) and From Legal Theory to Integrative Jurisprudence, 33 U. CiNc. L. RZv. 153

(1964).

16. J. HALL, LIVING LAw OF DEMOCRATIC SocIETY 84-89, 131-41 (1949).
17. See HalI, Integrative Jurisprudence,in STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE

IxAL THEORY 25-47 (1958)
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